Why am I so interested in newsstand rarity estimates and discussions? To understand my way of thinking, I’ll have to set the stage for you… it all comes down to relative value. Read my intro below first, or jump straight to the slideshow.
Background Info — Case Study: 35 Cent Variants
Before 1998, 35 cent variant comics from 1977 were broadly overlooked by collectors as a “class” of comics. Collectors going after any number of comics published during that cover price variant window could have chosen to seek out 35 cent copies or just place the more prevalent 30 cent copies into their collections, when seeking any particular issue in those early years before the variants took off…
Take Star Wars #3 as an example. The exact relative rarity of 35 cent copies wasn’t pinpointed in those early days, and the idea of CGC or their online Census wouldn’t exist until many years later — so there wasn’t a handy way to look up the relative graded count of each type (we are so spoiled nowadays by contrast 🙂 !!)… but those collectors who still put thought into the difference and came to the conclusion that the 35 cent copies were the ones they should target, instead of the regular prevalent 30 cent ones, now have big smiles on their faces today.
Because, fast-forward to today, and guess what? The relative rarity between the two types is now widely recognized among collectors, and 35 cent copies now command a large premium. The days of sellers not realizing their 35 cent copy was any different than the rest, are long gone. How much premium are we talking? Here are two recent eBay sales of Star Wars #3 below: notice that the first one is a CGC Universal Grade 3.0 copy and sold for $305 at auction, while the second one is a CGC Universal Grade 9.8 copy and sold for ~$225… Can you guess which of the two copies is the 35 cent variant? Yep: the top one.
Here are two recent sales of CGC graded copies of Star Wars #3. The top copy received a grade of 3.0 and auctioned for $305; the bottom copy received a grade of 9.8 and sold for ~$225. Both are Universal Grade (blue label). What’s different? The answer: the 3.0 copy has a cover price of 35 cents instead of 30 cents and shows up on the CGC census with relative rarity of 7.83%.
Why are collectors bidding up 3.0 copies of the variant to higher prices than 9.8 “regular” copies? Because there are simply far fewer of the variants out there. They were only sold to “test market” areas of North America, when Marvel was testing market reaction to a price increase — i.e. only the test areas got 35 cent copies, and as a result, fewer of that type were sold. Here’s the CGC census count for 30 versus 35 cent copies of Star Wars #1-4:
Issue
Census Count: Regular Copies
Census Count: Price Variants
Price Variant Percentage
Star Wars #1
5373
179
3.22%
Star Wars #2
764
71
8.50%
Star Wars #3
612
52
7.83%
Star Wars #4
511
55
9.72%
As you can see above, these 35 cent copies are quite rare on a relative basis to their “regular” 30 cent counter-parts looking at the CGC census numbers sitting here in the year 2016. For our Star Wars #3 example, only 7.83% of the total copies graded by CGC are the 35 cent variants.
So think back now to those early collectors who had the opportunity to choose to place 30 or 35 cent copies into their collections, decades back in time from today… The collectors who favored the 35 cent copies back then had two ways to win instead of one: (1) the issue number itself could rise in value over time (which it did), and (2) the relative rarity of 35 cent copies could command a premium over time (which it eventually did, and in a major way).
Newsstand Relative Rarity: Giving Us Two Ways To Win
In the same way that early collectors of 35 cent variants had two ways to win, I believe collectors today have two ways to win by targeting the more rare newsstand version of any given issue, especially in the special cases where CGC “breaks out” newsstand copies as unique variants on census — “Canadian Editions” (cover price variants), $2.99 Newsstand Editions (cover price variants), $3.99 Newsstand Editions (cover price variants), $4.99 Newsstand Editions (cover price variants), Newsstand Variants (UPC code “errors”), and Newsstand Editions (manufacturing differences such as different paper quality between the two versions).
Amazingly, comics from within each of these categories are able to be found today at prices in-line with their prevalent “regular” counterparts, simply because nobody is paying attention to them, and they don’t know the difference — just like very early sellers of 35 cent copies might not have known their copies were any different from others out there (if their neighbor took home the same type, why would they even think there might be another version out there in existence?). Here’s just one example, from the $3.99 Newsstand Edition category, where the more rare cover price variant can be found today for “regular” price… Amazing Spider-Man #569 (1st Anti-Venom):
The top copy is a prevalent direct edition copy with $2.99 cover price. The bottom copy is a newsstand copy with variant cover price — $3.99. Yet, the seller of the bottom listing did not title it with the “newsstand” keyword (nor the $3.99 keyword), and furthermore they priced their copy in-line with the going rate for the issue number at large.
Newsstand copies of Amazing Spider-Man #569 (first Anti-Venom) are a price variant.
Notice in this example how the seller of the rare cover price variant copy did not title their listing as such — in other words, the word “newsstand” did not appear in the listing title, nor did the “$3.99” keyword. This suggests that this seller did not know their copy was any different from the rest. But of course, it is: due to its variant cover price, this is one of the cases were CGC recognizes it as a variant and “breaks out” such copies.
Here’s one more example in the Amazing Spider-Man title. In the below screenshot, we see two sales of Amazing Spider-Man #601 in the same advertised grade. The bottom copy is actually the rare cover price variant (once you start to look at a lot of UPC codes — such as the pair at right, you start to be able to quickly recognize which copies are newsstand just by looking at the code box). And here once again the seller does not have “newsstand” in the title of the listing, nor “$3.99,” and they chose to price their copy right in line with the going rate for the regular prevalent direct edition:
The top copy is a “regular” direct edition copy of Amazing Spider-Man #601. The bottom copy is the rare $3.99 cover price variant only sold on newsstands. The seller of that bottom copy did not title their listing with the “newsstand” keyword (nor the $3.99 keyword) and priced their copy in-line with the going rate for the issue number in general.
In these examples, the buyer of the newsstand copy has two ways to win: having gotten in at similar cost basis to the prevalent direct edition, the issue numbers themselves may rise in value, and, the relative rarity of the newsstand variant may command a premium in the distant future — much like 35 cent variants are today prized for their relative rarity but for years were overlooked.
So That’s The Premise — Two Ways To Win
If you like the idea as I do of having “two ways to win” then you’ll also be interested in getting a sense of just how rare these categories of newsstand comics may in fact be relative to direct editions… And for this, one must focus on the industry: what was happening with the two comic book distribution channels, at different times?
This subject has been a topic of discussion and estimation by industry insiders, and I’ve collected a bunch of relevant quotes and graphics into this page in the slideshow presented below. At the bottom of the page are links to individual slides with my discussion of what I found particularly interesting about each slide.
I’ll present the slides in a moment, but first, for anyone interested in a quick take-away / summary, here is a “cliff notes version”:
The early “bar code strike-through” Marvel direct edition comics were sold to comic shops in 1979 and in that year were said to be 6% to >10% of sales depending on the title (the more popular titles like X-Men said to be at that higher range). This new distribution model exploded (the bar code strike-through would become the Spider-Man Rectangle and other such logos), and meanwhile newsstand sales collapsed, to the point where by the early 1980’s those comic book publishers who failed to embrace direct sales and instead remained reliant on newsstand sales began to fail… Harvey ceases publishing in 1982 [side note: later resurrected and had a Type 1A cover price variant window!]; Gold Key is defunct by 1984.
Meanwhile, at Marvel, for the 1985/1986 time-frame we see insiders talking about how the distribution pendulum had swung too far in the direction of direct edition; we see estimates of 50/50 newsstand/direct around this 1985/1986 time-frame. By 1990 we see estimates of 15% newsstand; when Bill Jemas joins Marvel in 1999 we are told not only that newsstand sales are down to 14% but that Marvel made a conscious decision to “walk away” from the newsstand model. By 2003 we see a newsstand estimate of just 4.25% for Marvel.
By 2013, when we see an industry-wide newsstand sales estimate of 6.8%, we also learn of Marvel’s decision to pull the plug on their newsstand sales through bookstore outlets thus ending Marvel sales of newsstand comics in 2013 — but we also learn that two years prior to that (circa 2010-2011) they had decided to end newsstand sales across all other outlets — there are $3.99 Newsstand Edition comics in this Marvel newsstand-wind-down time-frame!
Slideshow:
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This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. This slide is a great quote attributed to Wayne Gretzky: “I skate to where the puck is going to be, not to where it has been.” The reason I find this to be so applicable to newsstand comic books is that historically, collectors have been buying mostly direct edition comics after the mid-1980’s, with some of the other slides showing estimates like 85% direct edition by 1990, and 86% direct edition by 1999. That’s where the puck was, i.e. where collectors were focusing their comic-buying-dollars. But where is the puck going to be as far as newsstand vs. direct edition comic book desirability in the future? My own conclusion is that the rarity data and discussions show beyond a shadow of doubt that newsstand comics in later years are drastically more rare than their direct edition counter-parts: fewer of them were sold, fewer of those were preserved, the result is that surviving collectible-grade copies are more rare out there relative to collectible-grade direct edition copies — and the best part is that you and I can tell the two types apart and we can pay roughly the same price for the more rare of the two types. Much like 35 cent variants were overlooked for decades yet proved in the fullness of time to be the more valuable type versus their prevalent 30 cent counter-parts, I believe newsstand comics will come to be prized by collectors for their relative rarity in much the same way — especially the Canadian Editions, Newsstand Variants, and $3.99 Newsstand Editions where CGC recognizes them as distinct variants on census. These more rare versions give us a second way to win: the issue number itself may rise in value — that’s the first way — and the relative rarity may command a premium in the distant future, just like 35 cent copies now command a premium — that’s the second way.
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I have aggregated newsstand estimates across different sources. Note that all but the last column were indicated by the sources to be specifically about Marvel Comics, while the last was indicated to be an industry-wide number. The newsstand sales estimates for specific years are given for 1979, 1982, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1990, 1995, 1999, 2000, 2003, 2005, and 2013.
These estimates paint a clear picture that Marvel (and industry-wide) newsstand sales collapsed, representing a tiny fraction of total sales in later years for modern era comics. The later years are also very interesting in the context of that quote presented on another slide by Marvel’s David Gabriel, that they had ended newsstand sales to all but bookstore outlets back in what would have been circa 2010-2011, before pulling the plug on newsstand sales entirely in 2013. Since the more rare newsstand version is always discernable, collectors who prefer to go for one type over the other can tell them apart, and in some special situations CGC recognizes the newsstand version as a distinct variant on census.
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am discussing a quote by Chuck Rozanski about how Image Comics sold only 1% of their comics on newsstands: “Another consideration about newsstand editions is that different publishers produced them at different times. Image, for example, had a vigorous newsstand program right from the beginning, but still sold 99% of their comics through the Direct Market.” — Chuck Rozanski, Newsstand Editions History What is particularly interesting to me about this quote, is the idea that Image did in fact produce newsstand editions as opposed to being exclusively direct market sales (in another slide I show a book quote where Image is said to have been believed to be exclusive to the direct market!). The notion that fully 99% of Image’s comic book sales were direct edition copies sold to comic shops, would therefore give Image’s newsstand comics an extreme level of comparative rarity to direct edition copies, at just 1% newsstand. Presumably within this Image-wide estimate we’d see variation where less popular titles may have done more poorly, and the most popular titles such as Spawn, may have done better. (Along these lines, a quote from another slide says that in 1979 Marvel did 6% direct edition sales but over 10% for the popular X-Men, showing that the popularity of a given title may have effected its sales levels within the more broad “publisher-wide” numbers). Equally interesting is that there are CGC-recognized newsstand variants for those Image newsstand comics where there were manufacturing differences between the direct edition and the newsstand copies. By having distinct variants for some of these, we can examine how many copies of each type CGC has graded, and what the relative rarity ratio is — in another slide I provide 10 such examples, where as of this writing in 2016, a total of 3359 direct edition copies have been graded, versus 107 newsstand variants (that’s 97% direct edition versus 3% newsstand appearing on census).
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am discussing a quote from the book Economics of Digital Comics by Todd Allen and Mark Waid: “Unfortunately, accurate statistics are not available for the launch of Image Comics, a publisher made up of popular artists who broke away from Marvel to start their own company. It is believed that the first issues of several of their titles sold in the general area of 700,000 to one million copies, and these books were exclusive to the direct market.” — Todd Allen, Economics of Digital Comics What is particularly interesting to me about this quote is that Image Comics did not, in fact, sell comics exclusively through the direct market as the quote suggests. As shown in another slide, another industry participant estimated 1% of their comics to have been sold on newsstands… And as I showed on another slide with 10 examples of Image newsstand comics that show up on the CGC census as variants, about 2-3% are showing up as newsstand editions versus 97-98% direct edition. This is such a low percentage as to be nearly “invisible” and so it is completely understandable that others in the industry would reach the conclusion that Image was exclusively making direct edition sales — because actually finding any of their newsstand comics out there is very difficult, as they are buried under a mountain of direct editions.
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I have looked up the current CGC census count for 10 Image Comics titles where I know CGC “breaks out” newsstand copies as distinct variants due to manufacturing differences (such as different paper quality). By having distinct census variants, we can examine how many copies of each type CGC has graded, and what kind of relative rarity shows up. As of this writing in 2016, a total of 3359 direct edition copies have been graded across these ten examples, versus 107 newsstand variants. That works out to 97% direct edition versus 3% newsstand. What’s especially remarkable to me about this is how it compares to the relative rarity ratio we observe on the CGC census when examining 35 cent copies of different titles to 30 cent copies: for Star Wars #1-4 we currently see CGC census relative rarity ratio of 3.2%, 8.5%, 7.8%, and 9.7% for the rare and highly valued 35 cent variants.
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am discussing a quote from Erik Larsen about newsstand sales of Savage Dragon comics: “I can’t speak for the big two but I pulled Savage Dragon off the newsstand when it started costing me money. It wasn’t that I was breaking even — I was actually losing money.” “#28 was the last newsstand issue (although there was a newsstand one shot called Spawn/Savage Dragon #1, which was #30. Returnable books and the newsstand gamble have put many ambitious publishers out of business.” — Erik Larsen What is particularly interesting to me about this quote is that “the newsstand gamble” of returnable sales was a money-losing proposition for Savage Dragon comics by 1996, implying that sales towards that end date for the title were very low. In the context of the quote from another slide about how Image Comics sold fully 99% of their comics as direct editions, this quote by Larsen really drives the point home that Image Comics newsstand editions are incredibly rare as a percentage of the sales of any given issue, and then title by title we may see more variability. The fact that there was no newsstand version of #31 suggests that sales of Spawn/The Savage Dragon #1 were too low to justify continuation of newsstand sales, despite all the extra effort that went into that final attempt (extra efforts to attract newsstand buyers included an “as seen on TV” logo on the newsstand version, and a combination-Spawn/Savage-Dragon-logo). If the 99% direct to 1% newsstand ratio holds for Spawn/The Savage Dragon #1, and if sales of issue #30 were within the 35,000-40,000 ballpark range suggested by what we see for issues around that same time (#32 is when the monthly sales data starts at Comichron), and then applying a sales boost for having Spawn on the cover, then the math suggests there may only be on the order of 400 copies of Spawn/The Savage Dragon #1 out there…
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, we can see the start of direct edition comics (1979), the estimated 50/50 point where direct edition and newsstand sales were even slices of the market (circa 1985/1986 based on the estimates from another slide), and then the industry-wide estimated newsstand sales percentage in 2013, which was the year when Marvel pulled out of the newsstand sales model.
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am discussing a quote from the book Economics of Digital Comics by Todd Allen and Mark Waid: “Starting in the mid-1980s, in addition to being the primary distribution outlet for thest new or “independent” publishers, the Direct Market began to take on a greater ofer-all percentage of comic book sales for the traditional publishers, who were seeing a decline in the number of newsstands carrying their product.” — Todd Allen, Economics of Digital Comics What is particularly interesting to me about this quote is that it corroborates the discussions by Chuck Rozanski and Jim Shooter that the middle of the 1980’s marks the point in time when direct edition sales would overtake newsstand sales. In another slide, Shooter discusses how in 1986 the “pendulum had swung too far” in the direction of direct edition; and in the slide with Rozanski’s 1980’s estimates we see that he pegs the 1985/1986 time-frame as the 50/50 point between newsstand and direct.
“In the 1982-1986 period about 10% of Marvel’s print run was Canadian, with Newsstand and Direct Market editions split at about 50% each; because Newsstand editions have a far lower survival rate than Direct Market Editions, Canadian Newsstand editions may be as scarce or scarcer than Pence price variants, with both estimated to have original print runs equivalent to 5% of U.S. print runs, but with an estimated survival rate of only 1-2%.” — Jon McClure, A History of Publisher Experimentation and Variant Comic Books
In Overstreet #46, Senior Advisor Jon McClure discusses 1980’s Canadian price variants, their increasingly strong premiums in the marketplace, and the impact newsstand-exclusivity had on their rarity. McClure here estimates that roughly 80% of surviving copies are Direct Editions, and pegs surviving VF/NM-and-up Canadian newsstand comics at 50x to 250x scarcer than Direct Editions.
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am discussing a quote about 1980’s Marvel newsstand percentages: “Because I had such a personal vested interest in the growth trends of the Direct Market, during the early 1980’s I quizzed everyone at Marvel who would give me figures as to what impact comics shops were having on the sales at company. I derived the following estimated numbers specifically from conversations with Jim Shooter, Ed Shukin, Michael Hobson, and Carol Kalish: 1979 Direct Market 6% of Marvel’s gross sales 1982 Direct Market 20% of Marvel’s gross sales 1985 Direct Market 50% of Marvel’s gross sales 1987 Direct Market 70% of Marvel’s gross sales” — From Modifications to the Distribution System, Chuck Rozanski What is particularly interesting to me about this quote, is that it reveals Rozanski’s estimated newsstand versus direct edition sales percentages for 1979, 1982, 1985, and 1987. This is one of two Rozanski articles I’ll quote from, the second giving estimates for later years as well. It is particularly interesting to compare these estimates against those others have given, for example the quote that Marvel’s newsstand percentage was 14% when Jemas came on board in 1999, and the estimate by Miller that industry-wide newsstand sales in 2013 were 6.8%. Also interesting is the context of Jim Shooter’s discussion of trying to support the ailing newsstand market with ideas in 1986 that were ultimately shot down by the “brass” in favor of the profitable direct market.
Overstreet Advisor Greg Holland studied observed newsstand rarity for comics published 1980-1986 and shared his research, showing the percentage of CGC graded copies found that were direct edition vs. newsstand for each year studied. “I just checked the CGC listings on Ebay for the years we’re discussing and looked at the covers of the comics themselves (not relying on the word “newsstand” in the title)… CGC 1980 results in 82 direct editions, 48 newsstand CGC 1981 results in 98 direct editions, 27 newsstand CGC 1982 results in 103 direct editions, 27 newsstand CGC 1983 results in 114 direct editions, 21 newsstand CGC 1984 results in 120 direct editions, 10 newsstand CGC 1985 results in 130 direct editions, 9 newsstand CGC 1986 results in 160 direct editions, 5 newsstand These books have already been CGC graded, so we’re talking about “slab-worthy” comics from these years, but the results speak for themselves. For the mathematically lazy, that corresponds to: 1980 = 63% direct, 37% newsstand 1981 = 78% direct, 22% newsstand 1982 = 79% direct, 21% newsstand 1983 = 84% direct, 16% newsstand 1984 = 92% direct, 8% newsstand 1985 = 94% direct, 6% newsstand 1986 = 97% direct, 3% newsstand It’s just a sample, taken at a random time of day, but those were the results. Try it yourself, if you like!” – Greg Holland, Overstreet Advisor
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am discussing a quote about the state of Marvel’s newsstand sales in 1986: “I felt that we needed the newsstand market. That, if we became completely dependent on the Direct Market, we’d wind up in the same position as when we’d been entirely dependent on the newsstand market. Up the creek without a paddle. Screwed. Helpless. At their mercy. I spoke with Marvel’s newsstand sales manager, Denise Bové. Denise was in charge of our dealings with Curtis. Like me, she felt the pendulum had swung too far. So did our Curtis account people. We came up with a number of support-the-newsstand-distribution ideas. I suggested, for instance, doing a newsstand exclusive. Why not? You know the Direct Market shops would go to their local ID’s and buy copies anyway. It would be a big hit for the ID’s, and maybe the retailers they served. And great PR in that market. Maybe get them interested in comics again. A little. That would have been in 1986. At that point, I was engaged in daily battles with the President and the other owners of Marvel.” — Jim Shooter, Comic Book Distribution Part III What is particularly interesting to me about this quote, is that it reveals how by 1986 the pendulum had swung so far in the direction of direct edition sales (away from newsstand sales) that Shooter was trying to support the newsstand channel and engaging in daily battles. I find this quote particularly notable in the context of 1980’s newsstand sales estimates given by Rozanski (quoted in another slide), where his 1985 and 1986 estimates drawing from two different articles were 50% newsstand, down from 94% newsstand in 1979. That pendulum sure took quite a swing, considering that direct edition sales only began in that 1979 year.
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am showing a compilation of the average per-issue sales numbers and returns numbers for Amazing Spider-Man, from statements published by Marvel (note that not every year has a statement actually available, and eventually Marvel stopped publishing these). Because only newsstand sales were returnable (versus direct edition sales which were non-returnable), the returns column reflects only newsstand copies being returned. In 1978 there were more returns than sales; in 1979 distinguishable “direct edition” comics began to be sold; in 1980 the first “direct market exclusive” was introduced; 1982 is the last year where returns outnumber sales; by 1985 there are published estimates out there that direct edition sales overtook newsstand sales (as quoted in other slides). Looking at that 1985 returns number for Amazing Spider-Man, in relation to the sales number, the level of returns was about half that of sales; down from return numbers exceeding sales numbers back in 1982 and prior. In the context of the quote from another slide about how newsstand sales were 14% when Jemas came on board in 1999, and that Marvel made a decision to “walk away” from the newsstand, for that 1999 year we have returns down to 77,951 copies, which would plummet to 17,210 copies for 2001. I present a bar chart of these figures in the next slide.
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am discussing the statement numbers for Amazing Spider-Man as published by Marvel Comics, for the years where these statements exist. I have charted two data series here: the blue bars are the average total sales per issue for Amazing Spider-Man for that year as reported by Marvel, and the purple bars are the returns per issue in the same reports. Any returns would only be returns of newsstand copies, because direct edition copies were sold on a non-returnable basis. For the period circled in cyan at the left, we can observe that the returns numbers exceed the sales numbers through 1982. As quoted in another slide, it was common for newsstands to sell only on the order of 30% of the comics displayed, and the rest would be returned to the publisher. Therefore we can look at the purple bars, and draw a reasonable conclusion that newsstand sales were some amount smaller than the returns. The average returns of the later years circled in orange is a very low average number, which suggests the number of copies actually sold on newsstands would be smaller still. Marvel eventually stopped publishing these statements, but as we saw on another slide, David Gabriel indicated newsstand sales through outlets other than bookstores ended sometime circa 2010-2011, while newsstand sales to those bookstore outlets ended in 2013. For that 2013 year, as we saw on another slide, the industry-wide newsstand sales estimate for that year came in at a mere 6.8%. We also saw on another slide that when Jemas came on board in 1999, Marvel’s newsstand sales represented 14%; and a decision was made to “walk away” from the newsstand.
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am discussing a quote about the state of Marvel’s newsstand sales in 1987: “With sales of comics melting away into the much more efficient Direct Market specialty stores, only the most dedicated newsstands chose to keep comics available after 1987.” — Chuck Rozanski, Modifications to the Distribution System What is particularly interesting to me about this quote, is that it provides insight into the state of Marvel’s newsstand sales in the year 1987 and thereafter. I find this quote particularly notable in the context of Rozanski’s 1987 newsstand sales estimate of 30%, and also in the context of the quote from another slide about how newsstand sales were 14% when Jemas came on board in 1999. It is also interesting from the perspective of the newsstands themselves and how their choice entered into the decision, reflecting how comics were competing with other publications like magazines for “real estate” on the newsstand, and continuing to carry comics was not necessarily something newsstands even wanted to continue doing, especially after 1987.
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am discussing a quote by Chuck Rozanski about how Marvel Comics might not have survived the 1980’s without the growth of direct edition sales: “If you consider that the expansion in market share by the Direct Market was paralleled by the simultaneous collapse of the newsstand business, it becomes clear that Marvel Comics would not have survived the 1980’s without the robust growth in comics specialty shops.” — Chuck Rozanski, Modifications to the Distribution System What is particularly interesting to me about this quote, is that the idea that Marvel might not have survived the 1980’s without the tremendous growth in sales of direct edition copies of their comic books. Equally interesting is how this growth took place in the context of the “collapse of the newsstand business” which shows how other publishers who didn’t embrace direct sales the way Marvel did would have been completely exposed to that collapse.
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am discussing how the rarity of the Canadian price variants of the 1980’s would have been related to estimated newsstand percentages — this on account of the fact that the price variants were a newsstand-only phenomenon. The direct edition copies across all of North America were the same and carried both US and Canadian prices on them; but the newsstand copies were split into two different batches during a window of time in the 1980’s. So during that window, the rarity of the cover price variants would be determined by what fraction of the Canadian market for comics was serviced by newsstands, versus serviced by comic shops (where the comic shops sold direct edition, not newsstand copies). By population, Canada was 9.8% of the North American market for comic books as a “starting point” during the cover price variant window, and then that sliver of the market is then divided up between direct edition versus newsstand… with just the newsstand portion receiving the cover price variants which CGC denotes as “Canadian Edition” on their census. At the 50/50 point of division of that 9.8% into newsstand/direct, estimated to be in the 1985/1986 timeframe, we can estimate rarity of 4.9% for the Canadian price variants.
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am discussing a quote from Jim Shooter where he links out to the writings of Chuck Rozanski: “In the mid to late 1970’s, the comic book Direct Market started to evolve. The story of its origins is told better than I could ever tell it, starting here: [ this links out to Rozanski’s “Evolution of the Direct Market Part I” ]. I differ from Chuck Rozanski’s accounts only in details, which are in the big picture, of no consequence. To wit, I believe that I was present for his first meeting with President Jim Galton and, in fact, played a part in making that meeting happen. … ” — Jim Shooter, Comic Book Distribution Part III What is particularly interesting to me about the link Shooter shared here, is that one of the parts is an estimation by Rozanski of newsstand sales figures for the 1980’s. But the whole multi-part read is a very interesting one, and it is clear to me from reading it that Rozanski is an industry insider with lots of great information that he has generously decided to type up and share with collectors. As the owner of the largest comics retailer in the country (according to the Mile High Comics website), with over 10 million comics in inventory, Rozanski also took a step not all other retailers have done: breaking out inventory between newsstand and direct edition. That presumably gives Rozanski a wealth of internal information/data about newsstand versus direct edition rarity.
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am discussing a quote by Jim Shooter describing internal opposition at Marvel to special efforts to support the newsstand distribution channel: “Kalish vehemently opposed a newsstand exclusive. She vehemently objected to any support of any kind for the newsstand. She claimed that the Direct Distributors and shop owners would see any such things as betrayal, rise up in anger and retaliate against Marvel. Why not just hand the Direct Market over to DC?” “The Direct Market was easy money, quick money, sure money to the brass—not that any of them had ever set foot in a comics shop or even opened a comic book. To them it was about moving the units and collecting the cash. Might as well have been widgets we were selling. But, they knew the Direct Market was shooting fish in a barrel. Why jeopardize that?” — Jim Shooter, Comic Book Distribution Part Three What is particularly interesting to me about this quote, is how it reveals internal opposition at Marvel to the idea of special support for the ailing newsstand distribution channel. The idea that a “newsstand exclusive” would cause comic shop owners to feel betrayal is such an interesting notion — and highlights how throughout modern comic book history, the shops and the newsstands were in competition… A comic book buyer picking up the next issue of Amazing Spider-Man on the newsstand didn’t need to buy it from the local comic shop (and vice versa). This sets up an interesting dynamic where newsstand comics were almost an “enemy” of comic shops.
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am discussing a quote from Jim Shooter about the history of comic book returns: “Things changed. The cost of shipping the returns back was a burden. Eventually, Independent Distributor Wholesalers (“ID’s”) were allowed to merely tear the covers off and return those as evidence of the number unsold. Of course, some ID’s would then sell some of the coverless books through various lower-tier or bargain outlets, or for paper pulp.” — Jim Shooter, Comic Book Distribution What is particularly interesting to me about this quote is that during different periods of time, entire comics might have been shipped back, representing the ones that did not sell through on the newsstands. But then at some point to save on the shipping cost, they were accepting torn-off covers as evidence of unsold copies. This discussion by Shooter definitely highlights the variability of what happened to newsstand comics if they didn’t sell. The fate of the returned copies is an element of newsstand survivorship/rarity.
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am discussing a quote from Jim Shooter about the history of comic book returns: “The reason unsold books were called returns is that, in ancient days, all unsold copies were returned to the publisher intact! Publishers were free to redistribute their publications to secondary or international markets, offer them through a back issue service, or sell them for pulp.” — Jim Shooter, Comic Book Distribution What is particularly interesting to me about this quote is that during different periods of time, the fate of returned copies could be different. If unsold copies were returned intact and sold into a secondary market, that is a far different survivorship scenario than if unsold copies were pulped.
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am discussing a quote from Chuck Rozanski on the early days of direct edition sales: “A critical bit of data about newsstand ratios comes from a long conversation on the subject that I had with Jim Shooter, way back in 1979. Jim had been quietly keeping track of Seagate’s sales to comics shops, even though that was not really within the pervue of his role as Editor-In-Chief. What he told me at that time was that approximately 6% of Marvel’s total sales were going into comics shops through Seagate (and a couple of other smaller distributors), but that certain fan-favorite titles (such as X-Men) were over 10%.” — Chuck Rozanski, Newsstand Editions History What is particularly interesting to me about this quote is that amidst the broad 1979 direct edition sales percentage of 6% at Marvel, there were also “fan favorite” titles such as X-Men (and presumably Amazing Spider-Man too), where sales were 10% — or over. To me this highlights one of the elements of variability collectors must keep in mind when considering relative newsstand vs. direct edition rarity: that title by title, we may see differences in the sales numbers. Even issue by issue we may see differences, due to each issue’s unique circumstances: one example of this was the division of Amazing Spider-Man issues into three different newsstand UPC codes, where some stores didn’t get all of them despite all being within the Amazing Spider-Man title.
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am discussing one of my favorite quotes by Jim Shooter about the newsstand channel: “The newsstand cast a wide net. It funneled wannabe collectors into the comics shops. In a way, the spotty, unreliable, inconsistent nature of newsstand distribution was a good thing, because someone who just had to have every issue was more or less forced to seek out a comics shop.” — Jim Shooter What is particularly interesting to me about this quote, is how well it describes the forces that would drive comic book buyers into the shops, transforming a more casual buyer hooked on reading a given comic book title, into a regular comic shop customer and perhaps even a collector from there. There is an example with the cycling of the UPC codes on Amazing Spider-Man where one of the last newsstand outlets in Georgia missed every third Amazing Spider-Man issue. A reader finding themselves with this kind of “hole” in the story would pretty much be forced to seek out a comics shop to buy the missed issue, just like Shooter described in that quote. And from there, might very well have become a regular customer of the comic shop… thereby taking home direct edition copies from that point forward.
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am discussing a quote about the state of Marvel’s newsstand sales in 1986: “I felt that we needed the newsstand market. That, if we became completely dependent on the Direct Market, we’d wind up in the same position as when we’d been entirely dependent on the newsstand market. Up the creek without a paddle. Screwed. Helpless. At their mercy. I spoke with Marvel’s newsstand sales manager, Denise Bové. Denise was in charge of our dealings with Curtis. Like me, she felt the pendulum had swung too far.” — Jim Shooter, Comic Book Distribution Part III What is particularly interesting to me about this quote, is that it reveals how by 1986 direct edition sales had grown to such a degree that Shooter and others were nodding their heads in agreement that the pendulum had swung too far, and Marvel was at risk of becoming entirely dependent on the direct market. I find this quote particularly notable in the context of the estimates of newsstand sales for the 1980’s given by Rozanski (quoted in another slide), where he estimated the 50/50 point of newsstand/direct was in the 1985/1986 time-frame.
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am discussing a quote where David Gabriel talks about how the newsstand model was not working for Marvel Comics — not working for years: “Gabriel said “the business in the direct market [the comics shop market] is a much stronger model and try as we might, we have not been able to make the comics newsstand model work for years, I don’t think anyone has.”” — ComicsBeat, 2013 What is particularly interesting to me about this quote, is that the idea that Marvel’s newsstand distribution channel wasn’t working for them for years before they finally pulled the plug. This is especially interesting in the context of the quote from another slide about how Marvel’s newsstand sales had dwindled to 14% when Jemas arrived in 1999, and that Marvel had recognized back then that this was a distribution channel it would have to make the decision to walk away from. The title of the ComicsBeat link is also particularly interesting in the “and no one noticed” aspect, i.e. it had been months since the last new comics arrived in bookstores — reflecting just how insignificant this distribution channel had become into its last year.
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am discussing a quote about Marvel’s newsstand sales and returns related to one another: “While it was seldom that a newsstand sold more than 30% of the new comics they displayed (they were able to return unsold copies for full credit at the end of the month), comics specialty stores were a guaranteed 100% sell-through, as they purchased on non-returnable basis. Freed from the enormous printing costs of publishing three comics for every one that sold, and also being able to eliminate the administration costs of issuing credits for returns, the publishers suddenly found themselves awash in profits.” — Chuck Rozanski, Destroying the Entry Point of Most New Readers,” What is particularly interesting to me about this quote, is that it provides insight into how the introduction of Direct Edition sales would change the dynamics of comic book distribution. The idea that newsstands only sold 30% of the comics they displayed gives us a sense of the relationship between sales and returns, i.e. that returns would have been a large number in comparison to sales, because if only 30% of the comics displayed were sold, that leaves 70% being returned. In the context of some of the Amazing Spider-Man sales and returns numbers over the years (presented on another slide), this is really fascinating to contemplate because it could spell rarity numbers for later Amazing-Spider-Man issue that are incredibly low: for example consider the average returns number given for the 2001 year at 17,210 copies (if that is what was returned, then a smaller number would have been sold in the context of that 30% / 70% relationship that Rozanski discussed in this quote). Also very revealing in this quote is the phrase “awash in profits” to describe how publishers benefitted from the shift to more direct market sales.
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am discussing a quote by Chuck Rozanski about how Image Comics sold fully 99% of their comics as direct edition copies: “Another consideration about newsstand editions is that different publishers produced them at different times. Image, for example, had a vigorous newsstand program right from the beginning, but still sold 99% of their comics through the Direct Market. Dark Horse has been extremely spotty, with most licenced comics having newsstand distribution, while almost none of their own titles came with barcodes. We are still struggling to figure out all these crazy variations.” — Chuck Rozanski, Newsstand Editions History What is particularly interesting to me about this quote, is that it provides insight into how the newsstand sales percentages were different at different publishers. Image Comics, as an up-start in 1992, had an incredible amount of competition not just from magazines but other comic book publishers on newsstands. The idea that fully 99% of Image’s comic book sales were direct edition copies made to comic shops, would give Image’s newsstand comics an extreme level of comparative rarity to direct edition copies. Presumably the most popular titles like Spawn would have done better than other titles, for instance I quote Erik Larsen in another slide about how Savage Dragon sold so poorly on newsstands that he pulled the newsstand plug and went exclusively direct edition by 1996 (Spawn/The Savage Dragon #1 being his final attempt on the newsstand, and an incredibly rare comic book to find). Manufacturing choices such as cheap newsprint paper and omitting special features such as centerfold posters may have been an attempt by Image to control costs and try to remain competitive on the newsstands. Manufacturing differences such as these cause CGC to “break out” newsstand copies of some Image titles, so we can actually see the count of each type — in another slide I present the current census count for a series of Image titles, where we find as of this writing in 2016 that across ten known examples, 3,359 direct edition copies appear on census, versus 107 newsstand copies (3% newsstand to 97% direct edition).
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am discussing a quote about the 1999 Marvel newsstand sales percentage: “When Jemas arrived at Marvel in 1999, newsstand sales were at 14%, according to the BPA’s audits for the first half of the year.” — From The Business Of Content What is particularly interesting to me about this quote, is that it reveals the newsstand versus direct edition sales percentages for 1999: at 14% newsstand, that would make it 86% direct edition. In another quote I’ll get to later in the discussion, Jemas described a Marvel decision from this time-frame to “walk away” from the newsstand.
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am discussing a quote from the book Economics of Digital Comics by Todd Allen and Mark Waid: “Examining Business of Performing Audits International’s (BPA) “Circulation Statement for the 6 Month Period Ended June 2003” for Marvel Comics, several interesting things come to light. First, in the breakout for May 2003, the Total Qualified Circulation is 3,095,661 copies. Of that number, only 131,625 are “Single Issue Sales,” or newsstand-distributed copies. If May is representative of Marvel’s circulation, and there is no reason to believe otherwise, then only 4.25% of Marvel’s circulation comes from the traditional newsstand distribution system.” — Todd Allen, Economics of Digital Comics What is particularly interesting to me about this quote is that it provides a late-modern-year newsstand percentage estimate for Marvel at 4.25% in 2003… I find this estimate especially interesting in the context of the 1999 quote from Jemas about Marvel deciding to “walk away” from the newsstand model (and the 1999 number at 14% newsstand). I also find it interesting in the context of Rozanski’s estimates of 5% newsstand by 2000 and 2% newsstand by 2005 for Marvel — this 2003 year falling nicely in between. Also fascinating is the context of Comichron’s industry-wide estimate of 6.8% for 2013, suggesting that Marvel was well below the industry for newsstand percentage in its later years of newsstand distribution.
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am discussing a quote by Jim Shooter about how he lost his battles to help support the newsstand: “The Direct Market was easy money, quick money, sure money to the brass — not that any of them had ever set foot in a comics shop or even opened a comic book. To them it was about moving the units and collecting the cash. Might as well have been widgets we were selling. But, they knew the Direct Market was shooting fish in a barrel. Why jeopardize that? Circulation V.P. Ed Shukin, both Kalish and Denise’s boss, kept his head low and his mouth shut. He knew which way the wind was blowing upstairs. So, Denise and I lost and Kalish won. I was gone from Marvel not too long afterwards, so, it was my problem no longer. Kalish passed away in 1991, but ultimately Marvel arrived where she wanted it. And that’s where we are now.” — Jim Shooter, Comic Book Distribution Part III What is particularly interesting to me about this quote, is that it provides insight into how the “brass” at Marvel felt about Direct Edition sales, as compared to newsstand sales. In the context of another quote from another slide about how publishers were “awash in profits” on account of direct edition sales, it would definitely make sense that the sales-focused executives would choose the more profitable distribution channel to support. But in doing so, newsstand sales suffered to the point where the pendulum had swung so far, that Marvel was completely dependent on direct market sales. Shooter mentions how Marvel ultimately arrived at that point of total direct edition dominance; it is interesting too to see that 1991 year mentioned, in the context of some of the other slides — for example there is that quote that a mere 14% of Marvel’s sales were newsstand by the time Jemas arrived at Marvel in 1999; and Rozanski’s 1990 estimate of 15% newsstand sales.
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am discussing a quote by Chuck Rozanski about how Marvel Comics chose to open up their distribution system to new entrants in 1979: “Marvel’s choosing to open up their distribution system to new entrants in 1979, and providing working capital at the same time, turned out to be the turning point in the history of the company. In fact, if you consider that the expansion in market share by the Direct Market was paralleled by the simultaneous collapse of the newsstand business, it becomes clear that Marvel Comics would not have survived the 1980’s without the robust growth in comics specialty shops.” — Chuck Rozanski, Modifications to the Distribution System What is particularly interesting to me about this quote, is that the idea that Marvel not only opened up their distribution system to new entrants in 1979 — the year when sales of discernable “direct edition” copies of comic books began — but provided working capital at the same time. Described here as a “turning point” it also explains part of the business reason that we saw such tremendous growth in sales of direct edition copies of comic books in the 1980’s. With the newsstand business collapse taking place at that time, Rozanski suggests Marvel might not have even survived the 1980’s had they not tapped into that direct edition sales channel to the specialty comics shops.
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am discussing a quote by Jim Shooter about the first Direct Edition Exclusive, Dazzler #1 in 1980: “At the end of 1980, Marvel published the first regular comic book that was sold exclusively through the Direct Market, Dazzler #1. It sold 428,000 copies.” “After that success, many more Direct-only offerings were published by Marvel and others. As the Direct Market boomed, increasingly it became the focus at Marvel. It was a low-margin business, yes, but it was firm sale, and it was pretty easy to target Direct Market consumers. We knew what they wanted. It was like shooting fish in a barrel.” — Jim Shooter, Comic Book Distribution Part III What I find particularly interesting about this quote is how “direct edition exclusives” such as this were something you could only find in the comic shops, i.e. they simply did not print any newsstand copies. So for these cases of direct edition exclusives, the number of newsstand copies sold of the issue would be -zero-… This may have had the effect of increasing total direct edition sales by year, i.e. the 1980 direct edition total sales number at Marvel would have incremented by the amount of those Dazzler #1 sales, with no corresponding increase to the total newsstand edition sales for that year. Also particularly interesting is that “shooting fish in a barrel” quote, revealing how the top executives felt about the direct market. Something else I find interesting to contemplate about direct edition exclusives is how it would have had the incremental effect of drawing collectors away from the newsstands and into the comic shops, because these comics simply could not be bought on newsstands. Having come to a comic shop to buy one of these exclusives, the shop owner might then succeed in turning that shopper into a regular customer, perhaps even get them into the idea of collecting if they had just been a reader previously.
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am discussing a quote where Marvel’s Bill Jemas discusses a decision to “walk away” from the newsstand chanel: “When Jemas arrived at Marvel in 1999, newsstand sales were at 14%, according to the BPA’s audits for the first half of the year, and the company made a conscious decision to walk away from the newsstand in favor of reprint collections in bookstores, owing to the serialized nature of the stories. “I have a pretty good imagination, but I can’t see a twelve-year-old going to a newsstand six months in a row to pick up the right Spider-Man comic to get a complete story. I can see a twelve-year-old going to a bookstore and picking up a book with the whole Spider-Man story in it,” is how Jemas explains the decision.” — The Business Of Content What is particularly interesting to me about this quote, is the idea that in 1999 Marvel was only selling 14% of its comics on newsstands, and that in this time-frame Marvel had made a “conscious decision” to walk away from newsstand sales in favor of compilations sold through bookstores.
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am discussing a quote by Jim Shooter about how it made sense for Marvel Comics to remain in the newsstand market past the point where it was losing money: “Newsstand sales also raised our total circulation, which enabled us to charge more for advertising space in the books. Given the economies of scale and other benefits the newsstand provided, it made sense to remain in that market even if we were only breaking even there. Even if we were losing a little money!” — Jim Shooter, Comic Book Distribution Part Three What is particularly interesting to me about this quote, is the idea that Marvel could charge a higher rate for advertising as a result of its newsstand distribution raising total circulation numbers, and as a result, it made sense to continue to sell newsstand comics even after the point where it was a money-losing distribution channel.
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am discussing a quote from my Q&A with the seller of “The Doc Collection” (a large collection of 50,000 all-newsstand late modern comics): “Q) I feel very fortunate to have picked off some of the Doc’s comics at auction, especially some Amazing Spider-Man books in incredible shape. But there are notable “holes” in the Doc’s ASM run, which seem to correspond to the UPC code that was used on them. At some point, Marvel started “cycling” the codes on these, alternating between “Amazing Spider-Man”, “Friendly Neighborhood Spider-Man”, and “Sensational Spider-Man”. It seems every third comic was missed by the Doc? A) I was puzzled by Doc’s Amazing run when I first saw it — after they started putting Amazing and Friendly on the UPC code every third issue was missing! I found out later about the missed ones that they had Sensational Spider-Man on them!!!” What is particularly interesting to me about this exchange, is the idea that this gigantic collection of 50,000 newsstand comics was missing every third ASM issue — and that those missed copies had to do with the distribution: Any copy with the Sensational Spider-Man UPC code simply wasn’t sent to the drugstore. I find this to be a very interesting highlight of the idea that newsstand distribution was spotty and unreliable, and that we may see quite a lot of variability in the numbers issue by issue depending on strange circumstances such as this.
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am discussing a quote from my Q&A with the seller of “The Doc Collection” (a large collection of 50,000 all-newsstand late modern comics): “Q) I’ve noticed some Doc listings where there’s a sticker over the UPC code, like the Wolverine #47 listing, I’m curious if you can tell what’s behind that sticker, i.e. is this maybe a case where there wasn’t a distinct print run of newsstand copies for that issue number and the distributor is using copies from the direct edition print run and covering up the UPC code with a sticker to get the right code onto it? A) According to what I’ve been told when there was a mistake like with price instead of reprinting them, a sticker was placed on the comic! Along with the 47 I’ve found JLA 118 and Superman 677 had stickers also!! Even crazier is that there’s two different stickers for the Sup 677–I only have one of them!!” What is particularly interesting to me about this exchange, is the idea that some newsstand batches were mistakes and the UPC codes were covered up by stickers. Might some issues not even have distinct newsstand copies, but have stickers slapped onto copies out of the direct edition print run? We see a similar phenomenon in the case of Spawn Batman where bookstores got copies out of the direct edition print run with white UPC code stickers slapped onto the back — yet it turns out that there was indeed a distinct batch of copies printed for the non-bookstore newsstand outlets as well for that issue. Lots of mystery and strange circumstances issue by issue with newsstand comics!
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am discussing a quote where Marvel’s David Gabriel confirms the end of newsstand sales: “Gabriel confirmed that Marvel’s single-issue comics program to bookstores has been ended. He said that Marvel ended newsstand sales of print comics “about two years ago”” — ComicsBeat, 2013 What is particularly interesting to me about this 2013 quote, is the idea that not only did Marvel shut down newsstand sales to the last remaining newsstand outlets (bookstores), but that about two years prior to that — which would have been circa 2010-2011 — they had ended newsstand sales outside of those bookstore outlets. This paints a picture of stark relative rarity numbers for Marvel newsstand comics into those final years of newsstand sales. Especially in the context of the industry-wide newsstand collapse — in another slide I quote Miller’s 2013 estimate of just 6.8% newsstand sales across the industry. If that’s where the industry found itself in 2013, where was Marvel, which had already pulled out of all other newsstand outlets about two years before?
This slide is part of my post entitled Newsstand Rarity Discussion & Estimates where I have collected quotes and graphics related to the discussion of relative newsstand rarity over the years, compared to direct edition copies. In this slide, I am sharing my own conclusion about newsstand desirability. Representing a smaller percentage of sales after the mid-1980’s, and then being purchased by a “mostly-reader-group,” surviving collectible-grade newsstand copies are very rare in contrast to collectible-grade direct edition copies. Therefore, given the opportunity to buy a Near Mint surviving copy out of one channel or the other at similar price, my preference is the newsstand copy hands down. As mentioned in another slide, during the mid-1980’s there’s also a cover price variant window where the higher cover price variants were the newsstand copies sent to Canada (which was 9.8% of the North American market for comic books by population size) — I prefer those newsstand variants when they exist. Another known cover price variant window where higher priced copies are a newsstand-only phenomenon is $3.99 newsstand editions.